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REPORTS OF CASES
DETERMINED IN

THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
(56 C.Id 11; It CaI.Rph-. 25. 3a P.Id 25)

[L. A. No. 25637. In Bank. May 29, 1961.]

SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES SYSTEM, INC. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
et al., Appellants.
[1] Aeronautics-Airports.-The actions of a city international
airport in its capacity as a port of entry to the United States
must be viewed as they may affect commerce with foreign
nations. Such view poses federal questions even in the absence
of Congressional enactment.
[2] Taxation-Place for Taxation-Personal PropertJ'.-Although
movable personalty is generally held to be taxable only at its
owner's place of residence, it may attain a tax situs different
from such place by reason of permanency of location or use
within the taxing jurisdiction.
[3] Id.-Place for Taxation-Personal PropertJ'.-The basis for a
tax situs of movable personal property other than the owner's
place of residence must be reasonable and cannot be supplied
by arbitrary acts of the owner, taken for purposes of tax
avoidance.

[2] See Oal.J'v.2d, Taxation, § 116 et seq.; Am.J'v., Taxation,

1448.
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Aeronautics, § 5(1}; [2,3] Taxation,
§88; [4] Taxation, §91; [5,8,9,14] Taxation, §§90, 94; [6,7,10,
13,16] Taxation, § 90; [11] Taxation, §§ 91.5, 94; [12,20,23] Taxation, § 91.5; [15, 19] Aeronautics, § 1; [17] Taxation, §§ 91, 91.5;
[18] Commerce, § 8; [21] Treaties, § 1; [22] Treaties, § 4; [24]
State of California, § S.
(11 )
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[4] Id.-Place for 'l'axation-Vessels.-Ocean-going vessels, plying international waters, engaged in either interstate or foreign
trade, even when owned by residents or citizens of this COUDtry,-may not be taxed by any jurisdiction other than that of
their home port, and the jurisdiction of domicile may tax such
instrumentalities on a full ad valorem basis.
[6] Id.-Place for 'l'axation-Instrumentalities of Oommunication:
l1Diformity.-The denial of taxing power to nondomiciliary
states does not depend on the actual fact of taxation at the
domicile, but is based on the proposition that instrumentalities
of communication with other nations comprise a field which
admits of but one uniform system of regulation, which by its
very nature must be exclusively federal.
[8] Id.-Place for 'l'axa.tion-Instrumentalities of Oommunication.
-Because of the exclusively federal nature of the field of instrnmentalities of communication with other nations, it makes
no di1ference that Congress has not acted in the field of taxation
of such instrnmentalities.
[7] IeL-Place for 'l'uation-Instrnmentalities of Oommunication.
-Instrnmentalities of interstate commerce which do Dot leave
the United States (such as railroad rolling stock and vessels
plying inland waters only) may be taxed in each jurisdiction
wherein they are engaged in commerce.
[8] IeL-Place for'l'axation-Instrnmentalities of Oommunication:
l1Diformity.-In order to avoid a burden on commerce, the
various jurisdictions authorized to tax instrnmentalities of
interstate commerce which do not leave the United States must
eonftne themselves to a levy on an apportioned basis, related
to the time or use within the jurisdiction, rather than to benefits
conferred, in order that the total taxes so assessed shall not
amount to more than one single ad valorem tax.
[Da, Db] Id.-Place for 'l'axation-Instrnmentalities of Oommunication: l1Diformity.-The right of one jurisdiction to tax instrumentalities of interstate commerce which do not leave the
United States on an apportioned basis precludes the right of
the jurisdiction of domicile to tax on a full ad valorem basis.
[10] Id.-Place for 'l'axation-Instrumentalities of Oommunication.
-The furnishing of benefit and protection, standing alone,
does not confer on any jurisdiction the power to tax an instrumentality of commerce unless the instrnmentality falls within
the class of property which may be taxed according to settled
principles.
[4] Situs of vessels for tax purposes, note, 26 A.L.B.Sd 1376.
See also Cal.Jur.2d, Taxation, § 125; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 912
et seq.

)

)

May 1961]

SCANDINAVIAN.Anu.INES SYSTEM,
COUNTY OF Los ANGELES

IN'c. tI.

13

(58 C.2d 11; 14 cal.Rptr. 15. 183 P.2d 15]

[11] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Airplanes: tJniformity.-Airplanes
flying solely in interstate commerce, based in the United States
or owned by domestic concerns, and which do not leave the
jurisdictional limits of the United States, will be taxed under
the same principles which apply to other instrumentalities of
interstate commerce.
[12a-12e] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Airplanes.-The "home-port"
doctrine, under which no jurisdiction other than that of the
true domicile may tax instrumentalities of communication engaged in foreign commerce, applies to foreign owned and
foreign based and registered aircraft flown exclusively in
foreign commerce with but a single United States port.
[13] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Instrumentalities of Communication.
-Any instrumentality of commerce is subject to taxation in its
true domicile, but this power to tax is subject to limitations as
to the manner of taxation when a taxable situs has been acquired in another jurisdiction. The Deed for such limitation
arises from the necessity of protecting against double taxation.
[14] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Instrumentalities of Communication:
tJniformity.-Not every instrument of commerce may gain more
than a single taxable situs. When such a vehicle becomes an
instrument of communication with foreign nations, the apportioned basis of taxation is unworkable because the courts
of this country can exercise no control over the foreign taxing
authorities; the matter then should become an exclusively
federal one.
[15] Aeronautics-Law Governing.-As the vessel which sails the
seas is subject to admiralty law, airplanes flying international
skies are subject to all manner of international aviation law.
They are in no manner the equivalent of instrumentalities of
commerce which travel exclusively between the various states
of this country.
[16] 'laxation -- Place for 'laxation - Instrumentalities of Communication.-Any instrumentality which engages in commerce
between two or more sovereign nations must have but one
taxable situs, and such situs must be the port where the instrumentality is in good faith domiciled.
[17] Id.-Place for 'laxation-Vessels: Airplanes.-As a matter of
principle it should be held that both seagoing vessels and airplanes engaged solely in interstate commerce are subject to the
apportionment theory of taxation, regardless of utilization of
inland or international routes. But when they are instrumentalities of communication with foreign nations and enter the

[11] Situs of airplanes for purposes of taxation, Dote, 153
A.L.R. 264.
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territory of a given state for the sole purpose of utilizing a
port thereof as a port of entry to the United States, there is
no distinction between a ship or an airplane when both engage
in commerce between nations; both are amenable to international law and agreement, each may be fully taxed in its
home port in such manner as the laws of the domicile provide,
and those laws are not subject to review by the courts of the
nation in which the nondomiciliary port is located.
[18] Commerce-Tua.tion.-While valuation may be used as a
basis for taxing an instrument of commerce when the owner is
a resident or when the instrumentality has otherwise acquired
a taxable situs, the power so to tax is based on the right to tax
the person on his financial investment. If the charge attempted
to be imposed is one which, by the terms of the statute or
ordinance imposing it, may become due from an instrumentality
of foreign commerce without any services being rendered to it
or without the enjoyment of special benefits and from the mere
fact that it has arrived in a port of the state, it is a charge
on tonnage and not collectible.
[19] Aeronautics-Applicability of Admiralty Concepts.-Since the
advent of the airplane there has developed a large body of
international air law which, when substituted for admiralty
concepts, provides equal reason for considering international
air flights on the same basis as vessels sailing international
waters.
[20] Tua.tion-Place for Taxation-Airplanes-Effect of Federal
Legislation and Regmations.-Though federal legislation and
regulatory enactments relating to air traffic do not indicate an
intent to enter or bar the states from entering the field of
taxation of foreign owned and foreign based and registered
aircraft flown exclusively in foreign commerce with but a
single United States port, they do indicate the peculiarly
federal nature of the entire field.
[21] i'reaties-lfature.-Treaties represent executive action and,
although approved by the Senate, are not the Congressional
action contemplated by the commerce clause (U. S. Const.,
art. I, § 8, c1. S).
[22] Id.-As Supreme Law.-Treaties are the supreme law of the
land, binding on the courts of every state. (U. S. Const.,
art. VI, cl. 2.)
[2Sa, ISb] Tua.tion - Place of Taxation - Airplanes - Effect of
Treaty With Sweden.-The terms of the treaty respecting
double taxation between the United States and Sweden (effective in 1940), 'which specifically bans property taxes on ships
and air lines if such vehicle of commerce is not registered
in the taxing nation, prevent the several states from imposing

J
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any type of property tax on airplanes owned, based and
registered in any foreign country unless the overall operations
.of the owner bring such airplanes within the area of property
to be taxed, as such is defined in that treaty.
[24] State of California - Sovereignty. - The principles of state
sovereignty apply to internal matters only. No state is sovereign in the eyes of a foreign nation; it cannot deal directly
with a foreign nation by treaty or otherwise; this it must
leave to the federal government.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Affirmed.
Action by owner of foreign owned and registered aircraft
to recover property taxes levied by both a city and county
against airplanes flown exclusively in foreign commerce. Judg-

ment for plaintiff affirmed.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Alfred Charles
De Flon, Deputy County Counsel, for Appellants.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett, Elvon P. Musick, Roderick M.
Hills, Richard D. Esbenshade and Kenneth E. Scott for Respondent.
Condon & Forsyth, Darling, Shattuck & Edmonds, Cyril
H. Condon, Hugh W. Darling, Rodolphe J. A. de Seife,
Graham, James & Rolph, Robert D. Mackenzie, Foley, James
& Conran, Frank J. Foley, James J. Conran, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Turner H. McBaine, Noel Dyer, Chapman,
Walsh & O'Connell, Joseph J. O'Connell, Jr., and Arthur
K. Mason as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
PETERS, J.-Defendants, the county of Los Angeles and
the city of Los Angeles, have appealed from a judgment
requiring them to refund to the plaintiff certain personal
property taxes which were levied against plaintiff's foreign
owned and based aircraft flown exclusively in foreign commerce, and which utilized Los Angeles International Airport
as their sole United States terminus. The United States
Supreme Court, and the highest courts of the several states,
have spoken with apparent finality regarding the right to
tax and the method of taxation of ocean-going vessels engaged
in both foreign and interstate commerce, and the courts have

16
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had occasion to determine similar questions involving aircraft
engaged solely in interstate commerce (Northwest Airlines v.
Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 [64 S.Ct. 950, 88 L.Ed. 1283, 153
A.L.R. 245] ; Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board
of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 [74 S.Ct. 757, 98 L.Ed. 967] ;
Slick Airways, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 140 Cal.App.2d
311 [295 P.2d 46]), and domestically owned and based airplanes engaged in foreign commerce (Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Ca1.2d 314 [333 P.2d 323]).
However, the precise problem presented here, wherein the airplanes sought to be taxed locally are: (1) foreign owned,
(2) foreign based and registered, and (3) flown solely in
foreign commerce with but a single United States port, has
not as yet, insofar as we have been advised, been passed on by
the appellate courts.
The facts are undisputed. Defendants' general demurrer
to plaintiff's complaint was overruled, and the parties then
stipulated that the material facts of the complaint be taken
as true, that judgment be entered in favor of plaintiff, without
necessity of further proof, and that defendants retain their
right to appeal from such judgment. The following is a summary of the material allegations of the complaint:
1. Plaintiff operates an air line, solely in foreign commerce,
between Copenhagen, Denmark, and Los Angeles, California.
All of its airplanes are owned, based and registered in one
of three Scandinavian home ports. 1 The service referred to
is rendered under a permit granted by the United States Civil
Aeronautics Board. The planes stop en route in Canada, but
touch the United States only at Los Angeles International
Airport.
2. During the period involved herein each of plaintiff's airplanes averaged eight round-trip flights per year, and remained at its Los Angeles terminus for less than 34 bours
on each flight.2
1For the purpose of this decision, plaintiff may be considered as the
operat.or and owner of the mentioned airplanes. Actually, plaintiff is
but the United States representative of a consortium of Danish Airlines,
Swedish Airlines and Norwegian Airlines. The airplanes are individually
owned by the respective members of the consortium, and are registered
and based in Copenhagen, Stockholm and Oslo, respectively. For the
purpose of their United States flights, the European terminus of each is
Copenhagen.
•Although the complaint is silent in regard to the use to which each
airplane is put during the balance of the year, it may be assumed that
by far the greater portion of such period is devoted either to maintenance
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3. None of the planes was physically present in Los Angeles
(or in the United States) on the first Monday of March in the
year for which taxes were levied.
4. Defendant County of Los Angeles assessed each of the
airplanes upon an "apportionment" basis, by means of a
formula which was intended to determine that portion of
the airplane's value measured by the period during which it
was physically present in the county. Such formula added one
hour "flying time" per trip, to the actual time spent on the
ground in Los Angeles, and divided this figure into the total
hours in the tax year. Based upon the assessment so calculated,
defendant county levied a personal property tax on each of
the airplanes on its own behalf, and upon behalf of the defendant city.
5. During the period for which defendants levied such tax,
each of the airplanes was taxed, on an unapportioned basis,
in its home port.'
6. No foreign country levies a property tax on aircraft
operated by any United States air line flying planes in foreign
commerce.·
7. The taxes levied by defendants constitute double taxation.
8. Plaintiff's operations in making the Copenhagen-Los
Angeles flights are subject to extensive regulation by the
United States government (17 specific regulatory measures
being alleged), and the United States is party to 19 separate,
and specifically alleged, international treaties directly or indirectly regulating and affecting such operations.
9. Plaintiff paid the taxes demanded by defendants, under
protest, and subsequently filed a claim for refund.
The pleadings raise no issue regarding the propriety of the
procedures taken on the claim for refund, and plaintiff does
not question the formula by which defendants" apportioned"
the tax. Hence the sole question involved is the validity of the
tax.
at its home port, to local transportation in its home country, or to inter·
national transportation in which California is not involved.
'Denmark, Sweden and Norway each taxed the "operations" of their
respective nationals which opernted airplanes based in those countries,
and Norway levied a property tax on the entire value of those pl8lles
wbich were registered and based in Oslo.
'Although not alleged in the complaint, it is argued by respondent,
and not denied by appellants, that such reprisal taxation is now being
threatened in several foreign eountries.
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Because of their interest herein, most of the foreign airlines
serving California have filed amici curiae briefs.

Oontention of the Parties:
In support of the judgment, plaintiff contends that: (1) the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution prohibits
the levy of this tax; (2) the tax is further prohibited by the
due process clauses of both the federal and California Constitutions; and, (3) there is no California statutory basis for
this taxation.
In support of its first contention-conflict with the commerce clause-plaintiff makes a three-fold argument. First,
it claims that since there is no relevant distinction between
aircraft flying the international skies and ocean-going vessels
plying the high seas, the former should be subjected to the
same "home-port" doctrine of taxation which the United
States Supreme Court has applied to the latter. Second,
plaintiff claims that taxation of aircraft based and owned in
a foreign country is a matter of international concern within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government (citing
various federal regulatory acts and international treaties
alleged to control). Its final argument in regard to the commerce clause is that "apportioned taxation" by California,
together with un apportioned taxation by the government of
the aircraft's home port, conflicts with the commerce clause
in that it imposes double taxation, and places a far heavier
burden upon such foreign aircraft than exists in the case of
aircraft owned domestically.
Plaintiff bases its second contention-repugnancy to the
due process clauses-upon the claim that its airplanes have
not acquired a taxable situs in California.
Its third contention is predicated upon the argument that
California's constitutional and general statutory provisions
for taxation of the various forms of personal property do not
contemplate the taxation of aircraft owned and based in
foreign countries and engaged in foreign commerce, and that
without specific legislative authority these defendants are
without jurisdiction to levy this tax.
Defendants contend that the commerce clause is inapplicable
on several grounds. The first is that although that clause gives
Congress the exclusive power to regulate commerce, such power
is not denied to the several states until Congress has preempted the field, which defendants claim has not been done.
The second is that taxation of personal property does not

)
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fall within that class of subjects which "admit only of one
unjform system, or plan of regulation," which phrase has
been applied as the test for exclusive legislation by the federal Congress. Defendants also claim that the decisions of
the United States Supreme Court indicate a trend away from
the "home-port" doctrine of taxation, and that if the question
were to be submitted to that court today it would repudiate
its former rule. As a final reply to the contention that the
commerce clause prohibits the instant tax, defendants argue
that instrumentalities of commerce, by their very nature,
acquire more than one taxable situs, and that the undue
burden on commerce which would otherwise be imposed is
properly avoided by a system of apportioned taxation in each
such situs; that the undue burden, if any, imposed on the
instant aircraft is not the result of defendants' apportioned
tax, but results from the fact that the domiciliary situs has
levied taxes on the full value.
R.eplying to plaintiff's contention that the due process
clauses prohibit this tax, defendants contend that the sole test,
insofar as due process is concerned, is whether the proposed
tax has reasonable relation to the opportunities, benefits or
protection conferred or accorded by the taxing state. Defendants then point out that an apportioned tax, based solely upon
the percentage of time which the property is actually within
the County of Los Angeles, satisfies this test.
In meeting plaintiff's third and last contention (lack of
statutory basis for the tax) defendants argue that the California Constitution fixes the liability of the property to taxation and the standard upon which it is based (i.e., in proportion to its value),Gand that the only further requirement is
that the Legislature provide the machinery by which to ascertain such value (citing McHenry v. Downer, 116 Cal. 20 [47
P. 779, 45 L.R.A. 737], and Crocker v. Scott, 149 Cal. 575
[87 P. 102]). How, or in what manner, the Legislature has
met this further requirement is not spelled out in defendants'
briefs.
f'he tI Home-Port" Doctrine:
As stated above, plaintiff's main contention in support of
the judgment is that the tax imposed by defendants violates
"Article XIII, section i, provides: "All property in the State .••
not exempt under the lnws of tile Unitl'd States, shnll be taxed in proportion to its value • • • ."
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the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Its
first point in support of this contention is that the United
·States Supreme Court has clearly prohibited such state taxation in a line of decisions enunciating the "home-port" doctrine. By a series of opinions, covering a period of over a
hundred years, that court has developed a body of law dealing
with the power of local authorities to levy property taxes on
instrumentalities of commerce which are transitory in character, and, in the course of engaging in trade, come within the
territorial limits of one or more of the states of the Union.
In each of the decisions embraced in that body of law, the
United States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance
of the true domicile, the port of registration, or home port,
of the particular instrumentality sought to be taxed. It should
be noted that in determining the validity or invalidity of a particular tax in light of this doctrine, the Supreme Court has
Dot confined itself to a discussion of the commerce clause, but
has also predicated its decision on the impact of the due
process clause on such taxation.' But if a decision in this
case is controlled by principles heretofore announced by the
federal courts, it makes little difference whether those principles were predicated upon one constitutional ground or
another. The task with which we are faced was well stated
in the Northwestern Airlines opinion (supra) as follows: "The
answer involves the application of settled legal principles to
the precise circumstances of this case." Thus, it is our duty
to determine what "settled legal principles," if any, are applicable to the tax here under consideration. If that determination leads to the conclusion that the "home-port" doctrine is applicable herein it is our duty to so declare, not
only because the United States Supreme Court has spoken with
finality in a field which is peculiarly federal in nature, but
because such principles have been definitely settled, and should
·The earlier decisions dealing with the "home-port" doctrine appear
to be based upon the commerce clause, in that they refer to an area of
eorumerce subject to the "laws of the general government, to which
belongs the regulation of commerce with foreign nations and between
tbe states." (Bays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U.S.) 596"
fl5 L.Ed. 254].) Subsequent decisions, as will be noted below, base the
doctrine squarely upon the due proce88 elause by reason of lack of tuable
situs in the taxing state. Still later, in NorlhtJJcst "firlines v. Minnesota,
B'Upra, 322 U.S. 292, the court held the question to involve both the
eommerce and the due process elauses, and failed to indicate clearly on
wllich the decision was predicated. See State Ta.a:atiOfi of IntematiOfial
"fir Tra1lllportatiOfl, 11 Stan.L.R. 518, at p. 520.
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not be overruled except for most compelling reasons which do
not here exist. It should also be noted that the basic principles which will determine the applicability or inapplicability
of the" "home-port" doctrine have been enunciated by this
court as well as by the United States Supreme Court.
A reading of both the federal and state cases on the subject
demonstrates that both courts have considered the subject
to embrace a federal question without reference to any theory
that it becomes such only when Congress pre-empts the field
by enacting legislation. In fact, the basic decisions (both federal and state) have declared the "home-port" doctrine (and
hence the invalidity of a proposed tax) although the federal
legislature hao; never spoken on the subject. Inherent in the
opinions, even when unstated, is a concept of the dual nature
of a port of entry. Thus, Los Angeles International Airport
is, on one hand, an integral portion of the city, county and
state, subject to the sovereign powers thereof, and on the other
hand is a port of entry to the United States. [1] In its
latter capacity its actions must be viewed as they may affect
commerce with foreign nations. Such view poses federal
questions even in the absence of Congressional enactment.
As early as 1851 taxing authorities in California attempted
to levy property taxes on vehicles of commerce that touched
temporarily in the various ports of this state. In 1854 the
United States Supreme Court held, in Hays v. Pacific Mail
Steamship Co., supra, 17 How. (U.S.) 596, that California
could not tax an ocean going vessel, owned and registered
in New York and operating in interstate commerce between
that port and various ports in California and Oregon. The
decision announced the rule that such a vessel might be taxed
at its full value in its home port, and that the other states
where it engaged in commerce were not entitled to levy a
property tax of any nature, even though the vessel made
regular stops therein for the purpose of discharging or taking
on passengers and cargo, and remained on each trip for
repairs and maintenance, and to await announcement of the
next voyage. The decision was predicated in part upon the
lack of a taxable situs in any but the home port, and held
that such vessels enter the ports of other states t< independently
of any control over them, except as it respects such ''/tunicipal
and sanitary regu7ations of tile loca.l authorities as are flot
inconsistc11t with the constitution and laws of the general gov-
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e.rnment, to which belongs the regulation 01 commerce with
foreign nations and between the states." (17 How. (U.S.) at
. p. 598; emphasis added.) The opinion failed to mention any
specific constitutional provision or federal law with which the
attempted tax was in conflict. The reference to the lack of
taxable situs gives credence to the claim that the doctrine was
placed, in part at least, upon the due process clause. However,
the statement to the effect that regulation of foreign and interstate commerce belongs to the federal government, indicates
that the court also predicated the doctrine, in part, upon the
commerce clause, even in the absence of any /ederallegislative
enactment on the subject. This theory is bolstered by the fact
that the opinion also stated that a vessel plying the high seas
in interstate commerce is subject to admiralty law, even when
lying in a domestic port other than that of her registry, and
as such differs from vessels which remain wholly within national waters. Thus, the rule appears to have been further
predicated upon a concept that a vessel which sails upon international waters must be subjected to different rules than one
which never leaves national waters. This appears to be the
only logical explanation for holding that an instrument of
interstate commerce is immune from state control or taxation
in the absence of any showing that the Congress has entered
the field.
Thus, the earliest statement of the "home-port" doctrine
granted the state of domicile the power to tax in full, and
denied to all other jurisdictions any power or right to tax
except as might arise under the police power, when a vessel
engaged in either interstate or foreign commerce used the
open seas as a highway between ports.
Since that date, the rule of the Hays case has been extended and modified, to fit differing situations, but insofar
as we have been able to determine, it has never been overruled. In fact, the court has specifically stated, as will be
noted below, that certain of the limitations subsequently
placed upon the rule were not to be deemed as altering the
doctrine as applied to ships plying international waters.
California thereafter accepted and applied the doctrine as
announced in the Hays decision (City &; County of San Francisco v. Talbot, 63 Cal. 485,488-489; Olson v. Oity &; County of
San Francisco, 148 Cal. 80, 82-83 [82 P. 850, 113 Am.St.Rep.
191, 7 Ann.Cas. 443, 2 L.R.A. N.S. 197] ; Oalifornia etc. Co.
v. City &; Oounty of San Francisco, 150 Cal. 145 [88P. 704] ;
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SayZes v. County of Los Angeles, 59 Cal.App.2d 295 [138
P.2d.768], and other cases).
In 1870 the "home-port" doctrine was extended to vessels
engaged in interstate commerce, and plying exclusively inland
waters (St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U.S.) 423
[20 L.Ed. 192]), but such extension was overruled in 1948.
(See Oft v. Mississippi etc. Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169 [69 S.Ct.
432, 93 L.Ed. 585].)
At a very early date the United States Supreme Court
held that the doctrine, denying to jurisdictions other than
that of domicile the power to impose property taxes, was
not dependent upon actual taxation in the home port (Morgan
v. Parham, 16 Wall. (U.S.) 471,478 [21 L.Ed. 303]). By such
decision, the United States Supreme Court inferentially held
that the "home-port" doctrine was not based so much upon
multiple taxation (which would clearly constitute a burden
upon commerce in derogation of the commerce clause), as it
was upon a concept of exclusive federal jurisdiction once an
instrumentality of commerce left its home port for international waters. Viewed in light of the rule (established by
the same court in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of PhiladeZphia, 12 How. (U.S.) 299 [13 L.Ed. 996]) that the commerce clause does not prohibit the states from regulating
commerce except in those fields wherein the federal congress
has acted or those fields which admit only of one uniform
system, it must be assumed that the authors of the "homeport" doctrine held that taxation of a vessel which arrived in
port via international waters falls within one of the two stated
exceptions. Since it was not contended that Congress had acted
in regard to such matters, it follows that taxation (except in
the home port) of vessels sailing upon the high seas was within
the latter classification. As the court stated in the Cooley
opinion: "Whatever subjects of this power [to regulate commerce] are in their nature national, or admit only of one
uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to
be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress." (12 How. (U.S.) at p. 319.)
During the process of interpreting the "home-port" doctrine the courts carefully distinguished between the home port
in its true sense (domicile of owner or permanent domicile of
vessel) and fictitious home ports created solely by registry
, (St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., supra, 11 Wall. (U.S.) 423;
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Old Dominion Steamship 00. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 [25 S.
Ct. 686,49 L.Ed. 1059]; Ayer & Lord Tie 00. v. Kentucky, 202
U.S. 409 [26 S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed. 1082] ; Southern Pacific 00. v.
Kentttcky, 222 U.S. 63, 67 [32 S.Ct. 13, 56 L.Ed. 96] ; Olson
v. Oity & Oounty of San Francisco, supra, 148 Cal. 80; Sayles
v. Oounty of Los Angeles, supra, 59 Cal.App.2d 295; Ships etc.
Oorp.v. Oounty of San Diego, 93 Cal.App.2d 522 [209 P.2d
143] ). By such limitation, the courts prevented the possibility
of a misuse of the doctrine by owners who would otherwise
create a fictitious home port in order to escape taxation.
In 1890 the United States Supreme Court declared a distinction between vessels in interstate commerce and railroad
rolling stock similarly engaged. In Pullman's Oar 00. v.
Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 [11 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed 613], it held
that because rolling stock has no fixed situs, and travels over
land, traversing and retraversing the various states, it must
be treated differently for the purpose of taxation from ships
which travel on international waterways, have a home port,
and touch land only incidentally and temporarily. Quoting the
earlier ease of Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 00. v. Maryland, 21
Wall. (U.S.) 456 [22 L.Ed. 678], the court stated that interstate commerce on land is so dissimilar from interstate commerce by water that the two operations do not have the ~e
aspects in reference to constitutional powers and duties of
state and federal government, and that since vehicles of commerce by water are instrumentalities of communication with
otker nations, the regulation of them is to be assumed by the
national Legislature (141 U.S. at pp. 23-24)."
The distinction thus announced between vessels sailing the
high seas and railroad stock traveling by land ultimately led
to the C< apportionment doctrine" of taxation as applied to the
latter. Such doctrine, thereafter applied by both federal and
California courts, authorizes property taxation in each jurisdiction into which a vehicle of interstate commerce enters
(American Refrigerator Transit 00. v. Hall, 174 U.S. 70 [19
S.Ct. 599, 43 L.Ed. 899] ; Union Refrigerator Transit 00. v.
Lynch, 177 U.S. 149 [20 S.Ct. 631, 44 L.Ed. 708]; Union
Transit 00. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 [26 S.Ct. 36, 50 L.Ed.
150] ). Such cases, however, did not alter the original "homeport" doctrine as applied to vessels, whether sailing the high
• Again inferentially holding that the "home·port" doetrine is not
predicated upon any present pre-emption of the field by the national
Legislature.
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seas or exclusively inland waters. The doctrine remained
applicable to all vessels which left the jurisdiction of a single
state until 1948, when the United States Supreme Court had
occasion to reexamine the rule. In the case of Ott v. Mississippi
etc. Barge Line, supra, 336 U.S. 169, the court inferentially
overruled the St. Louis decision, and held that there was no
distinction, insofar as the due process and commerce clauses
are concerned, between railroad cars and vessels when each
move between the states by exclusively inland routes. In upholding an apportioned tax by Louisiana on tugs and barges
operating out of another state on the Mississippi River, it
distinguished the former cases (which adhered to the "homeport " doctrine) on the ground that they involved ships sailing
the high seas. As to those cases which had applied the "homeport" doctrine of taxation to vessels plying only inland waters
(presumably the St. Louis case) the court stated that for one
reason or another the apportionment method of taxation had
not been considered. Thus, the St. Louis case was overruled
by implication. The decision would have been more precise
had the court expressly overruled the St. Louis decision on
the ground, only implied in the decision, that further analysis
indicated that the very basis of the "home-port" doctrine
(i.e., exclusive federal concern in regard to instrumentalities
of communication with other nations) does not exist when the
instrumentality does not leave the national boundaries. Of
utmost importance, however, is the language of the Ott opinion
(pp. 173-174) wherein the court said, "We do not reach the
question of taxability of ocean carriage but confine our
decision to transportation on inland waters." Thus, the
limitation placed upon the "home-port" doctrine by the Ott
decision does not rest upon whether the commerce is interstate
or foreign, but upon whether the instrumentality stayed
within the continental limits of the United States or travelled
in international waters. Probably the court in making this
distinction had in mind the reasoning, originally expressed
in the Hays case, that when a vessel sails the international
seas it becomes subjected to the rules of admiralty law, even
while at rest in a domestic port. In other words, the court held
(without specifically stating) that an instrumentality of commerce which leaves the nation's shores becomes so peculiarly
imbued with international characteristics that it would be
unwise to allow any state but that of domicile to exercise
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sovereignty beyond that necessary under ordinary police
powers.8
When the apportioned method of taxation was originally
adopted (first as applicable to railroad rolling stock, and
subsequently to ships operating exclusively on inland waters)
the taxation was held to be valid if levied under any formula
which was reasonably related to the use of the property in
the taxing state, or to the benefits or protection conferred on
the property by that state. But in Souther"!, Pacific 00. v.
Kentucky, supra, 222 U.S. 63, the court appeared to repudiate
the doctrine of measuring the legality of the tax by the benefits
or protection received. Because the case involved ocean-going
vessels, subject to the "home-port" doctrine, it cannot be said
to be determinative of any rule or formula for taxing those
instrumentalities which are subject to apportioned levies. Although we have found no case which requires the use of any
specific formula, it appears that any method which a state
uses to determine an otherwise legal apportioned tax must
bear such relationship to time or use within the taxing state
that the sum total of all apportioned taxes so levied by all
states will not exceed one full ad valorem assessment. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the ultimate announcement by the Supreme Court (predicated on due process) that:
"The rule which permits taxation by two or more states on
an apportioned basis precludes taxation of all of the property
by the state of domicile."· (Standard Oil 00. v. Peck (1952),
342 U.S. 382, 384 [72 8. Ct. 309, 96 L.Ed. 427, 26 A.L.R.2d
1371] .)
It was inevitable that the issue of full taxation at the home
port versus apportioned taxation at each port of call would
arise in regard to air transportation. Certain phases of that
issue have been presented to both the United States Supreme
Court and to the various appellate courts of this state; but
insofar as we have been able to determine, the precise question
involved herein has not been heretofore before any court.
The first United States Supreme Court case to consider the
subject was Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota (1944), supra,
322 U.S. 292. That case involved a :Beet of airplanes owned
"Although it might have bcen more logical to have stated a distinction
between interstate and foreign commerce it serves no real purpose to
speculate on what the court might do if presented with the same problem
today. Since we are here dealing with instrumentalities of foreign com·
merce, travelling international skies, tllC distinction, if any, between the
two bases for the doctrine is moot herein.
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and operated by a Minnesota corporation, registered with a
city of that state as their home port, utilizing that city as
their rest and overhaul base, and operating therefrom entirely
in interstate commerce. The court held that a Minnesota
property tax levied upon the entire fleet on a full ad valorem
basis did not violate either the commerce clause or the due
process clause. Even though the planes were known to be engaged in commerce in several other states (which might presumably tax them on an apportioned basis) the majority
opinion held that taxability by such other states was not before
the court. Thus, although the Northwest case authorized the
full ad valorem tax in the state of domicile, it cannot be said
to have applied the "home-port" doctrine to interstate aircraft. Neither can it be taken for authority that apportioned
taxes may be levied on such instrumentalities in each state.
The apparent inconsistency of the language (inferring that
both full ad valorem tax and apportioned tax might be possible
under some circumstances) may be explained by the fact that
the case preceded, by eight years, the Standard Oil case which
put an end to such possibility. At least, such was the basis on
which the court later explained the decision. (See Braniff
Airways case, 347 U.S. 590, infra.) A more substantive question arises from the fact that the Northwest decision did not
give consideration to those cases wherein it. had previously
held that instrumentalities of interstate commerce which do
not leave the continental limits of the United States will be
taxed on an apportioned basis in each state visited (Ott v.
Mississippi etc. Barge Line, supra)." Analyzed in light of
subsequent decisions, the Northwest case stands only for the
proposition that domestic airplanes, flying exclusively in interstate commerce, and not leaving the continental limits of the
United States, may be taxed at their home port on a full ad
valorem basis if the parties do not urge the possibility of taxation elsewhere. It cannot be held to be a final determination
-The autllOrization of a full ad valorem tax in the jurisdiction of domi·
cile follows the original "home·port" doctrine as the same stood l)efore
it was modified to exclude vehicles of interstate commerce which do not
lea'\"e inland routes. The various inconsistencies inherent in the decision
are not surprising wIlen it is noted that the court was unable to muster
a majority to a single opinion, and that the decision consisted of a
majority opinion by three justices, concurred in by two separate opinions
of single justices, together with a dissenting opinion of four (making
four separate and distinct opinions). Only the dissenting opinion dis·
cussed the relation between taxation of ocean·going vessels and oth('r
interstate vehicles as applied to airplanes.
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of whether the full ad valorem tax or an apportioned tax is
proper when aU the facts are known; and it is in no manner
a determination of the basis for taxation of airplanes engaged
in either interstate or foreign commerce and which fly outside
the limits of the country. It is certainly not authority of any
kind regarding foreign owned and based airplanes flying
exclusively in foreign commerce.
Taxation of airplanes was next presented ten years later
in Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board of Equalization
(1954), supra, 347 U.S. 590. In that decision the court authorized an apportioned tax by Nebraska on plaintiff's airplanes
which were domiciled elsewhere, but which were engaged in
interstate commerce in Nebraska. The case did not involve
foreign commerce, and the planes did not leave continental
United States. The court predicated the decision on taxable
situs in Nebraska (due process) and held that since there
was no demonstrable burden on interstate commerce, the commerce clause was no bar. In order to set at rest the inconsistencies of the Northwest decision, the court said, at p. 602:
"When Standard Oil Co. v. Peek •.. was here, the Court
interpreted the Northwest Airlines case to permit states other
than those of the corporate domicile to tax boats in interstate
commerce on the apportionment basis in accordance with their
use in the taxing state. We adhere to that interpretation. "10
The Northwest and Braniff cases (taken together with the
intervening Standard Oil decision) therefore. stand only for
the proposition that airplanes, flying solely in interstate commerce, and not crossing international boundaries, are to be
treated (for the purpose of taxation) in the same manner as
vessels engaged in similar commerce via exclusively inland
waters. The language and rationale of the decisions create
the inference that, should the United States Supreme Court be
presented with a situation involving airplanes engaged in
foreign commerce, or planes engaged in interstate commerce
via international routes,l1 it would apply the same doctrines
it has consistently applied to ocean-going vessels similarly engaged.
lOPerhaps it 'Would have been clearer had the court frankly admitted
t.lmt the apportioned doctrine of taxation was not urged by the parties
in the 'Northwest CRse, and hence the (,Ollrt had failed to consider its
impact upon their decision therein.
11 As between Alaska and other states of the union, 'With stops in
Canada; or 8S between Hawaii and the mainland.

)
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Two years subsequent to the Braniff decision the question
of taxation of airplanes was presented in California, in Slick
Airways v. County of Los Angeles, supt'a, 140 Cal.App.2d
·311.12 In that case the parties conceded that Los Angeles
County was entitled to tax, on an apportioned basis, a fleet of
airplanes owned by a Delaware corporation and operated in
interstate commerce between airports in various states, including Los Angeles. The only issue was whether Los Angeles
was entitled to tax on a full ad valorem basis a single airplane
which plainti1f purchased in that county and which it kept
therein for the purpose of conducting "shakedown" flights
prior to adding it to the fleet. The court held that such facts
did not give the airplane such permanent situs in Los Angeles
as would preclude taxation on an apportioned basis elsewhere,
and that the defendant county was therefore without the power
to levy more than an apportioned tax, From the point of view
of its place in this review of the growth of the doctrines governing taxation of instruments of commerce, the case is important
only in that it is the first California decision in which there
was an opportunity to determine the status of airplanes. The
opinion followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court
by SUbjecting the airplane in question to the same doctrines
which were applicable to ships similarly engaged. The decision
does not purport to deal with taxation of airplanes engaged in
flights outside of continental United States.
In 1958 this court decided Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County
of Los Angeles, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 314. Plaintiff, a Delaware
corporation with its principal place of business in Los Angeles,
operated airplanes in interstate commerce, as to which there
was no issue,l8 It also owned five airplanes which it operated
under the control of the United States military authorities
on the Pacific airlift, in support of the war in Korea. In a
four to three decision arrived at by a majority opinion of
three, one other justice concurring in the result, the court
held that a full ad valorem tax on such planes was improper,
and plaintiff was granted the only relief which it sought, i.e.,
refund of the difference between the tax paid on the full ad
valorem basis and a tax calculated on an apportioned basis.
The dissenting opinion expressed the view that since it was
UHearing by the Supreme Court was not requested.
"1'11e interstate plalles were taxed 011 an apportioned basis, and were
not involved in the action before the court.

1
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not shown that the property was subject to taxation elsewhere,
it should be subjected to a full ad valorem tax in California. I f
.None of the three opinions discussed the impact of the "homeport" doctrine as it might be applicable to airplanes flying
international skies. The authorities relied upon by the majority
(Northwest Airlines, Ott v. Mississippi etc. Barge Line, Stom.dard Oil Co. v. Peck, Braniff Airways, and Slick Airways, all
s-upra) were all cases involving instrumentalities of interstate
commerce which did not leave the continental limits of United
States. By placing reliance on these decisions, the majority
seemed to have been of the view that the Flying Tiger airplanes were to be treated as if they were engaged in interstate
commerce. The case cannot be considered authority for the
proposition that airplanes flying only in foreign commerce will
be taxed on either the "home-port" or the apportioned basis.
From the foregoing summary of United States and California decisions dealing with the "home-port" versus apportioned doctrines of taxation of instrumentalities of commerce,
certain conclusions may be drawn. These are the "settled
principles" which determine the validity or invalidity of the
instant tax, and may be stated as follows:
[2] 1. Although movable personalty is generally held to
be taxable only at its owner's place of residence, it may attain
a tax situs different from such place by reason of permanency
of location or use within the taxing jurisdiction;
[3] 2. The basis for such alternative tax situs must be a
reasonable one, and cannot be supplied by arbitrary acts of
the owner, taken for purposes of tax avoidance;
[ 4] 3. Ocean-going vessels, plying international waters,
engaged in either interstate or foreign trade, even when owned
by residents or citizens of this country, may not be taxed by
any jurisdiction other than that of their home port, as such
is defined above; and thc jurisdiction of domicile may tax
such instrumentalities on a full ad valorem basis;
[5] 4. The denial of taxing power to the nondomiciliary
states does not depend upon the actual fact of taxation at the
domicile, but is based upon the proposition that instrumentalities of communication with other nations comprise a
"Thc dissent acknowledged that multiple taxation would be unconstitutional, as II burden in violation 0:1' the commeree clau8c, but predicated
its argumcnt on tIlE' lack 0:1' e\"'iilence that the planes mig-lit be taxed else·
where; thus avoiding conflict with the establisllcd rule that power to tax
I!lsewhere, rather than actual taxation, is controlling.
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field which admits of but one uniform system of regulation,
which by its very nature must be exclusively federal;
, [6], 5. Because of the exclusively federal nature of the
field, it makes no difference that the Congress has not acted
in the field of taxation of such instrumentalities;
[7] 6. Because the proposition stated as (4), above, does
not apply to them, instrumentalities of interstate commerce
which do not leave United States (such as railroad rolling
stock and vessels plying inland waters, only) may be taxed in
each jurisdiction wherein they are engaged in commerce;
[8] 7. In order to avoid a burden on commerce, the various jurisdictions authorized to tax under the last stated principle must confine themselves to a levy on an apportioned
basis, related to the time or use within the jurisdiction, rather
than to the benefits conferred, in order that the total taxes so
assessed shall not amount to more than one single ad valorem
tax;1G
[9a] 8. It follows that the right of one such jurisdiction
to tax on an apportioned basis precludes the right of the jurisdiction of domicile to tax on a full ad valorem basis ;111
[10] 9. Since such practice would do violence to the
principles stated above, the furnishing of benefit and protection, standing alone, does not confer on any jurisdiction
the power to tax an instrumentality of commerce unless the
instrumentality falls within the class of property which may
be taxed according to the stated principles;
[ 11 ] 10. Airplanes flying solely in interstate commerce,
and based in the United States, or owned by domestic concerns, and which do not leave the jurisdictional limits of the
United States, will be taxed under the same principles which
apply to other instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
Neither state nor federal courts have as yet been called
upon to determine the application of these principles to domestically owned and based airplanes flying in foreign commerce, other than in the Flying Tiger case, which, for the
reasons already discussed, is not here controlling. Nor has
there been any occasion (prior to the instant case) to determine the applicability of such principles to foreign owned
; uObvious}y, thB rule can only be enforced within the United States,
where the Suprjlme Court may act as arbiter between the leVeral juris·
dictions.
, aeSee footnote 15, "'Fa.
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and based airplanes operating solely in foreign commerce and
touching only one port in the United States.
. [1Ia] It could be held that the instant case is controlled
by the "home-port" doctrine which has been uniformly applied by both state and federal courts for over a hundred
years; that under that doctrine no jurisdiction, other than
that of the true domicile, may tax instrumentalities of communication engaged in foreign commerce; and that airplanes,
:Hying the international skies, do not differ substantially from
vessels sailing the international seas. If these conclusions are
Bound, then, under the doctrine of sta.re decisis, the judgment
of the trial court should be affirmed.
But, because the precise question here involved has not
yet been passed upon by the federal courts, we think we should
also decide the question on principle. The question is, should
the "home~port" doctrine, as a matter of principle, be applied to the facts of the instant case'
We think that that doctrine should be so applied. The
prior cases, while they have not decided the precise point here
involved, have laid down a very definite pattern of constitutional law which we think is sound and controlling.
[13] It certainly has been established that any instrumentality of commerce is subject to taxation in its true domicile.
But this power to tax is subject to limitations as to the manner
of taxation when a taxable situs has been acquired in another
jurisdiction. The need for such limitation arises from the
necessity of protecting against double taxation. [Db] Thus
the instrumentality which, by reason of being engaged in interstate commerce, gains taxable situs in two or more states,
is subjected to taxation on an apportioned basis only; and
that fact limits the right of the domicile to impose a full ad
valorem tax. [14:] But, by reason of other considerations,
not every instrumentality of commerce may gain more than
a single taxable situs. When such a vehicle becomes an instrument of communication with foreign nations it is apparent
that the apportioned basis of taxation is unworkable because
the courts of this country can exercise no control over the
foreign taxing authorities. The matter then should become
an exclusively federal one. To this extent we agree partially
with the appellants herein who state in their briefs on file
that: "State taxation of the planes of foreign . air carriers
involves international political and economic problems which
the courts are incapable of satisfactorily resolving. Decision

)
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of whether the states should have the power to tax planes of
foreign air carriers engaged in foreign commerce should be
left exclusively with the executive and legislative branches
of the· federal government." Of course, appellants' quoted
statement was made in support of the argument that we are
unable to act in contravention of the tax. We cannot agree
with that conclusion. [12b] We do, however, find in their
statement solid ground on which to hold that the exclusively
federal nature of the :field requires us to apply the "homeport" doctrine, and thus to hold that no jurisdiction save
that of domicile has any authority to levy a personal property
tax on these airplanes. There is no logical basis for holding
that these airplanes differ from other instrumentalities of
communication with foreign nations, so as to avoid that doctrine. [15] As the vessel which sails the seas is subject to
admiralty law, airplanes flying international skies are subject
to all manner of international aviation law. They are in no
manner the equivalent of instrumentalities of commerce which
travel exclusively between the various states of this country. IT
[18] In our opinion, the basic reasoning behind the controlling principles is that any instrumentality which engages in
commerce between two or more sovereign nations must have
but one taxable situs. Common sense requires that such situs be
the port where the instrumentality is in good faith domiciled.
It is true that this conclusion does not explain the inclusion in the "home-port" doctrine of vessels plying international waters but engaged solely in interstate commerce. Such
vessels were originally included in the doctrine on the ground
that they never gained taxable situs in the port which they
temporarily visited. The view expressed in this opinion would
exclude them from the doctrine because, nQt being instruments of communication with a foreign country, they do not
"Such instrumentalities, be they ferry boats, tugs, motor vehicles or
railroad rolling stock, remain for unlimited periods of time within the
tmng .tate, utilizing the wharves, port facilities, rails, roads, streets
and other facilities of the state, moving from point to point therein,
loading and unloading at various points, and perliaps engaging in intra·
state activities therein. They have therefore been considered to have
gained a taxable situs in such state far beyond that which might be
applicable to that of a ship or airplane which enters the state only at a
port of entry to the United States, and which remains in such port until
it again leaves the country. There appears to be no reason why the
former should not be taxed in proportion to its semi-permanent sojourn
in the state and its use of divergent facilities unconnected with those at
the port of entry.
18 c.J4-I
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pose an exclusively federal question. This distinction, perhaps, can be explained on historical grounds. The faet that
the courts have not announced a change in the "home-port"
doctrine to the extent of excluding such vessels may be attributed to the fact that no case involving such an instrumentality of commerce has been brought before them in
recent times. [17] As a matter of principle it should be
held that both seagoing vessels and airplanes engaged solely
in interstate commerce are subject to the apportionment
theory of taxation, regardless of utilization of inland or international routes. But even if it were so held, such holding
would not affect the status of instrumentalities engaged in
commerce with foreign nations. Whether they be sailing vessels, steamships or airplanes, they are in a different category.
In our opinion, being instrumentalities of communication
with foreign nations, they remain subject to the "home-port"
doctrine and are not taxable anywhere but in the jurisdiction
of their domicile. They enter the territory of a given state
for the sole purpose of utilizing a port thereof as a port of
entry to the United States. In this respect there is no distinction between a ship or an airplane when both engage in
commerce between nations. Both are amenable to international law and agreement. Each may be fully taxed in its
home port in such manner as the laws of the domicile provide,
and those laws are not subject to review by the courts of the
nation in which the non domiciliary port is located. Otherwise double taxation would inevitably result. In the language
of the Hays case, each must be considered to enter the nondomiciliary port "independently of any control over them,
except as it respects such municipal and sanitary regulations
of the local authorities as are not inconsistent with the con·
stitution and laws of the general government to which belongs
the regulation of commerce . . . ."
A somewhat analogous situation has been discussed in those
cases involving the second and third clauses of section 10 of
article I of the United States Constitution.18 In reviewing
attempts by various ports of entry to levy charges against
ships entering their harbors, the federal courts have held such
'"The pertinent language provides:
" [cl. 2] No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection laws .••.
"[cI. 3] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Duty of ToJJ.Daire • • • ."
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charges to be valid when either the ship or its owner was
domiciled within the taxing authority (The North Cape (N.D.
Ill.), 18 F.Cas. 342), or when the charge was imposed for the
use of wharves or other facilities, as distinct from a general
tax (Vicksburg v. Tobin, 100 U.S. 430, 433 [25 L.Ed. 690] ;
Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261 [56 S.Ct. 194,
80 L.Ed. 215] ). But the federal courts have held such charges
to be invalid when they constituted an attempt to levy a
property tax on instrumentalities of commerce not domiciled
therein. (See Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 89 [6
L.Ed. 23] ; Packet etc. CO. Y. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 [24 L.Ed.
377] ; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. (U.S.) 581 [22 L.Ed. 201];
State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wan. (U.S.) 204 [20 L.Ed. 370].)
The rationale of those cases appears to be that: a duty of tonnage imposed upon an instrumentality of commerce (i.e., the
carrier as distinct from the cargo) which is not owned or domiciled within the state, and which duty is not a charge for a
specific service rendered, amounts to a duty levied as a condition to being allowed to enter or leave port; such a duty
represents an interference with commerce; and, no state is at
liberty to interfere with foreign commerce. The fact that the
present case involves an ad valorem tax rather than a tax
based upon tonnage of vessel does not alter the underlying
principles. [18] While valuation may be used as a basis
for taxing an instrumentality of commerce when the owner
is a resident, or when the instrumentality has otherwise
acquired a taxable situs, the power to so tax is based upon the
right to tax the person upon his financial investment (Wheeling etc. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273, 279 [25
L.Ed. 412]). If the charge attempted to be imposed is one
which, by the terms of the statute or ordinance imposing it,
may become due from an instrumentality of foreign commerce
without any services being rendered to it, or without the
enjoyment of special benefits, and from the mere fact that it
has arrived in a port of the state, it is a charge on tonnage,
and therefore not collectible (48 Am.Jur., § 651, p. 454, citing
various federal cases as well as this court's opinion in Oakland
v. E. K. Wood Lumber Co., 211 Cal. 16 [292 P. 1076, 80 A.L.R.
379]). There is no logical reason why the stated principles
should apply only if the proposed tax is based upon the gross
tonnage of a vcssel, and be inapplicable if the same tax is
based upon tIle vessel's value. Those principles are equally
applicable as a basis for applying the "home-port" doctrine
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to airplanes :flying exclusively in foreign commerce and utilizing a port of this state as a port of entry to the United States.
In attacking the "home-port" doctrine as here applied,
defendants urge several arguments. They contend that the
real basis for distinguishing between vessels sailing the high
seas and those plying only inland waters is not a commerce
concept at all and that it springs solely from the common law
concepts of admiralty which are not necessarily applicable to
airplanes. Such an argument overlooks the fact that the
vessels between which such distinction was made were all
engaged in interstate commerce, and that here we are dealing
with instrumentalities of foreign commerce. [19] Another
answer to the argument is that since the advent of the airplane
there has developed an equally large body of international
air law, which, when substituted for the admiralty concepts,
provides equal reason for considering international air :flights
on the same basis as vessels sailing international waters.
Defendants also urge the apparent trend of the United
States Supreme Court in declaring more and more exceptions
to the application of the rule as first announced in the Hays
decision. This, they argue, indicates a definite attitude in
opposition to the "home-port" doctrine. They claim that if
the higher court were given the opportunity today, it would
repudiate the entire rule as contrary to modern theories of
taxation. One answer to this proposition comes from the
United States Supreme Court itself. As mentioned above, in
our analysis of the growth of the doctrine, in 1948 that court
excluded vessels utilizing only inland waters from the application of the "home-port" rule (Ott v. Mississippi etc. Barge
Line, supra, 336 U.S. 169). In so doing, it expressly refrained
from making the decision applicable to interstate vessels
traversing the open seas. Why, then, should we anticipate a
change in regard to instrumentalities of foreign commerce, as
to which there is greater cause to apply the doctrine' If, as
is argued, that court is about to reverse itself, it is not for us
to anticipate such action. At this point we would not consider
a request to hold that a steamship plying the high seas in
foreign commerce is to be excluded from application of the
"home-port" doctrine. We should not be expected to do so
in regard to an airplane similarly engaged, when the controlling principles (and reasoning behind them) are equally
applicable. [12c] vIr e therefore hold the "home-port" doctrine to be applicable herein, and that the power to tax air-
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planes engaged solely in commerce with foreign nations is
vested exclusively in the place of true domicile, which jurisdiction may impose a tax on the full value, to the exclusion of
property taxation elsewhere, whether upon an apportioned
basis or otherwise.

Is the tax barred by federal regulation or international treaty'
This conclusion is sufficient to dispose of the case. But because we have elected to decide this case on principle as well
as on the doctrine of stare decisis there are other factors
that should be considered. One is the impact, if any, of
federal regulation and treaty on defendants' power to impose
the instant tax. Admittedly, under the commerce clause of
the United States Constitution, the Congress is given the
power to legislate as to interstate and foreign commerce to the
exclusion of the several states. If it has done so the tax here
involved must be held to be invalid. [20] Plaintift' does not
cite us to any federal legislation which, by its nature, specifically excludes state taxation. The regulatory enactments
which it pleads indicate that Congress has pre-empted the
field of regulating air traffic (both foreign and interstate) to
the extent of protecting public safety, welfare, convenience
and necessity. But none of the regulatory enactments indicate
an intent to enter, or to bar the states from entering, the field
of taxation. Insofar as they should be considered herein, the
federal regulations which have been called to our attention
do not bar the tax imposed by defendants. They do, however,
indicate the peculiarly federal nature of the entire field.
[21] The international treaties upon which plaintiff
relies pose a more difficult problem. They represent executive
action, and although approved by the Senate (U.S. Const.,
art. II, § 2, cl. 2) are not the Congressional action contemplated by the commerce clause (art. I, § 8, cl. 3). But they are
equally binding on the states. [22] Treaties are the supreme law of the land, binding upon the courts of every
state (art. VI, cl. 2). If the tax here under review is repugnant to the terms of any such treaty, the tax must be declared
invalid.
[23a] Of the several treaties alleged in the complaint as
regulating plaintiff's operations, three are of particular interest. These are: (1) •• Convention and protocol between the
United States of America and Sweden respecting double
taxation," dated March 23, 1939, ratified August 2, 1939,
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proclaimed December 12, 1939, and effective January 1, 1940
(54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958); (2) "Convention between the
United States of America and Denmark respecting double
ta:x~tion .... " dated May 6, 1948, and effective December 1,
1948 (62 Stat. 1730, T.LA.S. No. 1854) ; and (3) "Convention
between the United States of America and Norway for the
avoidance of double taxation ... " dated June 13, 1949 (2
U.S.T. [1951] pt. 2, p. 2323, T.I.A.S. No. 2357, and 2 U.S.T.
[1951] pt. 2, p 2353, T.I.A.S. No. 2358). These treaties, by
their language, are aimed at the avoidance of duplication of
taxation by the signatory powers, or by political subdivisions
thereof, in cases where nationals of one signatory power are
engaged in business in the territorial limits of the other power.
It is also clear that they are intended to cover shipping and
air traffic within the protected types of business ventures.
The extent to which they go, particularly with reference to
the types of taxation against which protection is afforded, is
not clear. If reference is made to the titles, only the treaties
with Denmark and Norway would appear to be limited to
taxes on income, estates and inheritances. Nothing in the
title of the treaty with Sweden limits the type of taxes which
is intended to be covered. The preamble of the latter states
that the parties are "desirous of avoiding double taxation and
of establishing rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in
the case of income and otlter taxes. . . . " (Emphasis added.)
Article I of that treaty sets forth a list of taxes (by general
type rather than specific name) as the "taxes referred to in
this Convention." In the case of the United States the list
includes federal income tax (including surtax and excess
profits tax) and federal capital stock tax. In the case of
Sweden income and property taxes are mentioned. As to both
powers, the list includes "any other or additional taxes imposed by either . . . upon substantially the same bases as
the taxes enumerated herein." If we were to read no further
it might be assumed that the treaty does not apply to property
taxes imposed by the several states of this nation. However,
article XIII, without referring to the statements made in the
preamble or in article I, provides that in regard to certain
types of property (specifically including air tramport undertakings) •• taxes on property or increment of property . . .
may be levied only in that contracting State which is entitled
under the preceding Articles to tax the income from such
property." Referring to such preceding articles, it is clear
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that neither nation may tax the profits of enterprises of the
citizens of the other except as such profits are allocable to a
permanent establishment in the taxing nation (art. II). Even
more specific is the provision that income of an enterprise
derived from the operation of a ship or aircraft shall be taxable only in the nation in which such ship or aircraft is registered (art. IV). Taking the treaty as a whole, we find that
the United States and Sweden have agreed that each will refrain from taxing either the income of or the property belonging to the nationals of the other country except insofar as such
income is allocable to or the property is a portion of a permanent establishment in the taxing nation. Insofar as ships and
air lines are concerned they have agreed to levy neither income
nor property tax even where there is a permanent establishment, if such vehicle of commerce is not registered in the taxing nation. Since plaintiff maintains no permanent establishment in the United States, and one-third of its airplanes are
registered and based in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, respectively, it follows that the instant tax, at least insofar as it is
applied to the one-third of the planes registered in that country, is barred by the provisions of the treaty with Sweden .
. Turning now to the treaties with Norway and Denmark, we
find no such specific ban upon property taxes as appears in
the Swedish treaty. However, clause XVI of the Danish treaty
provides that citizens of either of the contracting nations
(including persons, partnerships, corporations, associations,
etc.) while resident in the other contracting nation shall not
"be subjected therein to other or more burdensome taxes
than are the citizens of such other contracting State residing
in its territory. As used in this paragraph . . . 'taxes' means
taxes of every kind or description whether national, Federal,
state, provincial or municipal." This clause obviously expresses an intent to prevent a state, such as California, or a
city or a county, such as the defendants herein, from levying
a discriminatory tax against Danish nationals. It can be
argued that the apportioned property tax which defendants
seek to impose upon these airplanes is the same tax which
they impose upon all citizens (i.e., domestic air lines) of California or the United States. The fact remains, however, that
such tax is a ~'more burdensome" tax than imposed upon
domestic lines because the latter do not also pay ad valorem
property taxes in Denmark.
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Those Norwegian treaties mentioned above do not make
specific reference to personal property taxes, but they do
. contain language which may be relied on for an argument
that the federal government intended to relieve the Norwegian
air lines from taxes such as are at issue here. The treaty dealing with income taxes provides that income which enterprises
of either nation shall derive from the operation of ships or
aircraft shall be exempt from taxation in the other contracting
nation. The treaty concerning taxes on estates and inheritances, in providing for the taxable situs of movable property
in general, makes a specific exception of ships, aircraft and
shares thereof by providing that their taxable situs shall be
the place of registration or documentation.
In addition to the formal treaties alluded to above, there
are also in existence a series of executive agreements with
each of the three countries referred to as "Air Navigation Agreements," "Air Transportation Agreements," "Air
Worthiness Agreements," "Pilot License Agreements," etc.
The various "Air Transportation Agreements" (Denmark-58 Stat. 1458, E.A.S. No. 430, amended 60 Stat. 1646, T.I.A.S.
No. 1519; Norway-59 Stat. 1658, E.A.S. No. 482; Sweden58 Stat. 1466, E.A.S. No. 431, amended 60 Stat. 1859, T.I.A.S.
No. 1550) contain articles designed to "prevent discriminatory practices, and to assure equality of treatment," specifically prohibiting unequal charges for airport facilities, exemption from custom duties, etc., but none mentions taxation as
such. On the one hand this fact tends to sustain an argument
that the contracting parties did not intend to include taxation
within the possible discriminatory practices which they sought
to eliminate. On the other hand, it may be argued with equal
force that since there had never been a tax of this type imposed on the dates of the respective treaties and agreements,
the parties did not have the question of local taxes in mind,
and would have included them as a prohibited method of discrimination had they existed. Certainly, it is within reason
to infer that the foreign negotiators, unfamiliar with our dual
federal-state system, may have assumed that once they had
eliminated all possibility that the federal government would
levy a double or multiple tax, there was nothing left to fear
except the possibility of unfair discriminatory practices by
airports and other nongovernmental agencies.
In our opinion, the languag-e of the various treaties and
agreements clearly eliminates the possibility of local property
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taxation only insofar as concerns those airplanes owned and
registered in Sweden. As to that portion of the tax, the judgmentof the trial court must be affirmed on this point alone.
As to the remaining two-thirds of the airplanes, there remains considerable doubt as to the effect of the federal commitments, with only a possibility that the contracting states
intended to prevent any taxation of any nature (local or
otherwise) which would afford the domestic air lines of one
country any advantage over those of the other country where
such domestic and foreign lines may be in competition. The
instant tax would discriminate in favor of any United States
line competing with these Scandinavian lines in commerce
between the respective nations. But the mere possibility
that the signatory powers may have so intended is not sufficient ground on which to invalidate that portion of the tax
imposed upon the planes registered in Norway and Denmark.
Because we cannot spell out such an intent in the treaties
with those nations, we cannot invalidate the tax upon the
ground that it is repugnant to the terms of those treaties.
However, we have already determined that the tax is repugnant to the treaty with Sweden, and must be deemed invalid
as to the airplanes based and registered in that country. Does
this mean that defendants are prohibited from taxing Swedish
airplanes, and yet free to tax planes operating in a similar
manner, but owned and based in other foreign countries f
We think not. Such a situation would immediately create
discrimination between foreign commerce based in a treaty
country and similar commerce based in other nations. Such
discrimination would constitute interference with the free
flow of commerce. As said in Northwestern etc. Cement Co.
v. Miwnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 [79 S.0t. 357, 3 L.Ed.2d 421,
67 A.L.R.2d 1292], and in Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249,
256 [67 S.Ot. 274, 91 L.Ed. 265], the commerce clause denies
to the states" one single-tax-worth of direct interference with
the free flow of commerce." It is obvious that no individual
state has power to discriminate betwecn foreign nations.
[24] The principles of state sovereignty apply to internal
matters, only. No state of this union is sovereign in the eyes
of a foreign nation. A state cannot deal directly with a
foreign nation, by treaty or otherwise. This it must leave
to the federal government. If its attempted actions in a given
field would result in discriminatory practices as between two
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foreign nations, then it must eschew that field in its entirety.
This is but another way of saying, as we said above, that
taxation of foreign owned and based instruments of commerce
. represents a field that is peculiarly federal in nature, without
regard to such specific constitutional considerations as the
. commerce clause or the due process clause, and which must
bc left t~ the admmistration of the federal government, even
in the absence of any present federal legislation thereon.
[23b] For the reasons set forth, we are of the opinion
that the terms of the treaty with Sweden prevent the several
states from imposing any type of property tax upon airplanes
owned, based and registered in any foreign country, unless
the overall operations of the owner bring such airplanes
within the area of property to be taxed, as such is defined in
that treaty.
Additional issues urged by the parties:
The foregoing considerations are determinative of the matter. We expressly refrain from any decision upon plaintiff's
contention that neither the California Constitution nor any
statutory provision provides a basis for the instant tax. The
balance of the arguments have been answered above, or have
become moot by reason of the grounds upon which we base
our decision.
It is significant that we have been cited to no instance
wherein any state or political subdivision has ever attempted
to levy a property tax upon an instrumentality of foreign
commerce which was both owned and based in a foreign country. And this is true even though each of our major seaports
is visited regularly by passenger liners and freighters, operating on regular schedules, in the same manner in which plaintiff's airplanes visit Los Angeles International Airport. All
of the eases cited above dealt with vessels, airplanes, and
other instrumentalities owned or based in this country. The
entire lack of any case dealing with any instrumentality
owned or based elsewhere indicates that no state has ever
attempted to tax foreign instrumentalities of commerce arriving within its jurisdiction solely in foreign trade. If, during
the 185 years of existence of the United States such property
has been assumed to be nontaxable, it makes little difference
whether this belief stemmed from constitutional prohibitions
or from considerations of policy. If such assnmption were
now to be overruled, we would open the doors to state taxa-
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tion of every ocean vessel which, for 185 years, has been believed to be nontaxable. The repercussions would be worldwide. Retaliatory taxation would be inevitable. The states
could not cope with such a situation. The only escape from
such a result would be by holding that airplanes mi~ht be
taxed under circumstances wherein a ship may 110t. No logical
basis for such a distinction has been advanred.
The judgment is affirmed.
Schauer, J., McComb, J., and White, J., concurred.
DOOLING, J.-I concur in the judgnH'ut and with the
conclusion that the existing decisions of thc Supreme Court
of the United States on the "home-port" doctrine as it relates
to the right to tax vessels engaged in foreign commerce are
binding upon this court. This phase of the "home-port"
doctrine has ncver been modified or overruled and, if the
doctrine is to be reexamincd, the nation's highest judi.::ial
tribunal which announced it is the only court which can
effectively make such reexamination. Unless that court sees
fit to do so, and this case might afford a handy vehicle if its
Justices are so minded, I feel bound to follow the existing
law in this field as declared by its earlier decisions.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Neither the due process clause nor the commerce clause
nor the tonnage clause of the United States Constitution
precludes state taxation on an apportioned basis of aircraft
flown in interstate commerce. (Bl"o;n'iff A.i,·ways v. N ebmska
State Board of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590, 600 [74 S.Ct. 957,
98 L.Erl. 967]; see also Flying Tigcr Lim', l1!c. v. County
of Los A.ngcles, 51 Ca1.2d 314, 318 f333 P.2d 323].) They
do not preclurle equivalent taxation of aircraft owned by foreign domiciIiaries flown in foreign commerce.
"So far as due process is concerned the only question is
whether the tax in practical operation has relation to opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforrlerl h~'
the taxing State. [Citation.] Those requirements are satisfkrl
if the tax is fairly apportioned to the commerre carried on
within the State." (Ott v. 1I1ississip]Ji eir. Bm'gc Line, supra,
336 U.S. ]69, 174; Braniff Airways v. Nebmska State Board of
Equalizatio1l, s1tpro, 347 IT.S. 590, 600.) Since plaintiff's relationship to California is no rlifferent from that of airlines
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engaged solely in interstate commerce, and since the •• opportunities, benefits, or protection conferred or afforded" are not
affected by the locations of plaintiff's out-of-state termini, the
due process clause does not preclude the taxation of its aircraft.
Nor does the commerce clause or the tonnage clause! exempt
the instrumentalities of foreign commerce from state ad valorem property taxes. (Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania,
114 U.S. 196, 206 [5 S.Ct. 826, 29 L.Ed. 158] ; Old Dominion
Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 305-306 [25 S.Ct.
686, 49 L.Ed. 1059] ; P"Um,an's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22-23 [11 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed. 613] ; see
also Wheeling etc. Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S.
273,279-280 [25 L.Ed. 412].) Once their situs is determined,
a state may apply its own tax rate and collection procedures.
It is idle here to discuss the pros and cons of national uniformity. It could be achieved only if the states were declared
powerless to tax instrumentalities or" foreign commerce at
all or were empowered to tax them only pursuant to federal
, legislation.
The issue is whether there is discrimination against foreign
commerce. Obviously there is no discrimination if a state
taxes migratory property used in such commerce in the same
way it taxes migratory property used in interstate commerce.
Moreover, it precludes discrimination against interstate commerce. Plaintiff nevertheless contends that since the United
States Supreme Court cannot compel foreign countries to
apportion their taxes by taking into account the absences
from home of their domiciliaries' migratory property, taxation here even on an apportioned basis may lead to discriminatory cumulative burdens on foreign commerce. This argument
erroneously attributes to such taxation the risk of discrimination. Actually it is attributable to the freedom of foreign
countries, not permitted to our own states, to adopt rules
of their own that can result in multiple burdens. The court
cannot prevent foreign countries from taxing instrumentalities
of foreign commerce owned by their domiciliaries even if
those instrumentalities are permanently located here, just as
it cannot prevent foreign countries from taxing American
aircraft temporarily abroad even though they have been taxed
at full value at the domicile of their owners here. It is without power to compel independt'nt nations to adopt a uniform
'''No State alla1l, without the consent of the Congress, lay any Duty

of Tonnage.••• " (U.s. Con8t., art. I, § 10, el. 3.)
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nondiscriminatory system of taxation. It does not follow that
th~ states must forego the power to impose taxes that are not
in themselves discriminatory. It bears noting that Congress
remains free to prohibit altogether state taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce. Alternatively, treaties could
govern such taxation to preclude the risk of discrimination.
Plaintiff also contends that for purposes of ad valorem
taxation, aircraft flying in foreign commerce are logically
indistinguishable from ships sailing the high seas and hence
taxable only at the domicile of their owners. When the homeport rule was formulated for the taxation of ships in interstate as well as foreign commerce, there had yet to be developed the concept of taxation on an apportioned basis.
(See Ott v. Mississippi etc. Barge Line, 336 U.S. 169, 173
[69 S.Ct. 432, 93 L.Ed. 585] ; Aycr ff Lord Co. v. Kentucky,
202 U.S. 409, 421 [26 S.Ct. 679, 50 L.Ed. 1082]; Southern
Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63, 69 [32 S.Ct. 13, 56
L.Ed. 96]; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. (U.S.)
423, 431-432 [20 L.Ed. 192]; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall.
(U.S.) 471, 478 . [21 L.Ed. 303]; Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196. 206 [5 S.Ct. 826, 29 L.Ed. 158] ;
Hays v. Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. (U.S.) 596,597599 [15 L.Ed. 254]; Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299, 305 [25 S.Ct. 686. 49 L.Ed. 1059].)
The rule was abandoned in favor of apportioned taxes as
to vessels plying inland waters in Otf v. Mississippi etc. Barge
Line, 336 U.S. 169 [69 S.Ct. 432, 93 L.Ed. 585]. (See also
Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384 [72 S.Ct. 309,
96 L.Ed. 427, 26 A.L.R.2d 1371].) In leaving open the question of ocean carriage, the court in no way suggested that
the taxation of either ocean carriage or inland carriage would
depend upon whether it was interstate or foreign commerce.
Thereafter, in Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Board
of Equalization, 347 U.S. 590 [74 S.Ct. 757, 98 L.Ed. 967],
when the analogy between the high seas bordering the nation
and the airspace above the nation was urged against apportioned taxation of aircraft, the court nevertheless held that
aircraft flying in interstate commerce could be taxed on an
apportioned basis. This court adopted the same rule with respect to aircraft flying in foreign commerce in Flying Tiger
Line, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles, 51 Ca1.2d 314 [333 P.2d
323]. (See also Slick Airways v. County of Los Angeles,
140 Cal.App.2d 311, 315 [295 P.2d 46].)
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In the Flying Tiger case all members of the conrt agreed
. that aircraft flying in foreign commerce could not be taxed
at full value at the domicile of the owner in California if
they also had attained a taxable situs elsewhere. In contrast,
the majority in the present case invoke the home-port doctrine
for the conclusion that aircraft regularly flying into California from the foreign domiciles of their owners attain no
taxable situs here and that taxation on an apportioned basis
is therefore unconstitutional. Rationally, however, the homeport doctrine should apply to all aircraft regularly flying
in foreign commerce or to none. If the home-port doctrine is
applicable to all aircraft regularly flying in foreign commerce,
the Flying Tiger case must be overruled.
The Braniff case broke away from the home-port doctrine
wben it upbeld an apportioned tax on aircraft :flown in interstate commerce. There is no more reason to invoke the doctrine
for aircraft regularly flying in foreign commerce and bearing an identical relationsbip to tbe nondomiciliary state into
wbich they fly. If as plaintiff contends, aircraft cannot logically be distinguished from ships, it is the home-port doctrine,
not the Braniff decision, that must give way.
Plaintiff contends, further, that the treaties between the
United States and tbe Scandinavian countries with respect to
double taxation preclude ad valorem property taxation of
its aircraft in California. (See Convention and protocol between the United States of America and Sweden respecting
double taxation, dated March 23, 1939, ratified August 2,
1939, proclaimed December 12, 1939, and effective January
1,1940,54 Stat. 1759, T.S. No. 958, 199 L.N.T.S. 17; Convention between the United States of America and Denmark
respecting double taxation, dated May 6, 1948, and effective
December 1, 1948, 62 Stat. 1730, T.I.A.S. No. 1854; Convention between the United States of America and the Kingdom
of Norway for the avoidance of double taxation, dated June
13, 1949, 2 U.S.T. [1951] pt. 2, p. 2323, T.I.A.S. No. 2357;
2 U.S.T. [1951] pt. 2, p. 2353, T.I.A.S. No. 2358.) It notes
that each treaty provides that income from the operation of
aircraft shall be taxed only in the home country of sucb aircraft (Treaty with Denmark, art. V; Treaty with Norway,
art. V; Treaty with Sweden, art. IV). It contends that this
policy of reciprocity on taxation of income connotes a like
reciprocity as to local property taxation. There is no merit
in plaintiff's contention. The draftsmen of the treaties were
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familiar with both national and local taxation of property as
well as of income (Treaty with Sweden, art I; Treaty with
Denmark, arts. I, XVI; Treaty with Norway, art. I), and
they carefully specified the taxes to which the treaties applied
and the limitations on the taxing powers of the respective
nations. Under these circumstances it is not reasonable to
infer that restrictions on income taxation connoted restrictions
on property taxation; such an inference would require reading provisions into the treaties that were knowingly omitted.
It is contended, however, that article XIII of the Swedish
treaty makes the rule governing income taxation applicable
to the property taxes imposed on the Swedish-owned aircraft
in this case. Article XIII provides;
"In the case of taxes on property or increment of property
the following provisions shall be applicable:
"(1) If the property consists of: (a) Immovable property
and accessories appertaining thereto; (b) Commercial or industrial enterprises, including maritime shipping and air
transport undertakings; the tax may be levied only in that
contracting State which is entitled under the preceding
Articles to tax the income from such property.
"(2) In the case of all other forms of property, the tax
may be levied only in that contracting State where the taxpayer has his residence or, in the case of a corporation or
other entity, in the contracting State where the corporation
or other entity has been created or organized.
"The same principles shall apply to the United States capital stock tax with respect to corporations of Sweden having
capital or other properly in the United States of America."
Article XIII must be read together with article I, which
provides:
., The taxes referred to in this Convention are:
"(a) In the case of the United States of America: (1) The
Federal income taxes, including surtaxes and excess-profit
taxes. (2) The Federal capital stock tax.
"(b) In the case of Sweden: (1) The National income and
property tax, including surtax. (2) The National special
property tax. (3) The communal income tax.
"It is mutually agreed that the present Convention shall
also apply to any other or additional taxes imposed by either
contracting State, subsequent to the date of signature of this
Convention, upon substantially the same bases as the taxes
enumerated herein. . . ."
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Article I thus excludes local property taxation in the United
States from the ambit of the treaty and makes clear, as the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated in urging ratification of the treaty, that "the United States makes no agreement respecting any of our State or local taxes." (Report of
the Senate Foreign Relations Com., Exec. Rep. No. 18, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1939; see also Bittker and Ebb, Taxation of
Foreign Income [1960], p. 512.) Had it been the intention
to include such taxes, they would have been specifically mentioned as were the Swedish national property taxes and
communal income tax. A matter so vital as restrictions on
the taxing power of the states and their subdivisions would
hardly have been left to implication from the provisions of
article XIII, which are directly referable to Swedish property
taxes and the United States capital stock tax.
An interpretation of article XIII as applicable only to the
taxes defined in article I does not render the general language
of article XIII governing property taxation meaningless insofar as the United States is concerned, for that language states
the principles that shall also apply to the United States
capital stock tax or "any other or additional taxes imposed
by [the United States] . . . subsequent to the date of signature of this Convention, upon substantially the same
bases. . . ." (Art. I.) Such an interpretation gives effect to
both articles and avoids conflict between them. (See City 0/
Long Bcaeh v. Vick6rs, 55 Ca1.2d 153, 162 [10 Cal.Rptr.
359, 358 P.2d 687) ; Hough v. McOarthy, 54 Cal.2d 273, 279
[353 P.2d 276].)
Finally, plaintiff contends that the Legislature has not
provided for the taxation of aircraft on an apportioned basis.
Section 404 of the Revenue and Taxation Code provides that
"All taxable property, except State assessed property, shall
be assessed by the assessing agency of the taxing agency
where the property is situated." (See also Rev. & Tax Code,
§§ 201,405.) The word "situated" in this section refers not
to mere physical presence on tax day, but to the situs of
property within the state necessary to give jurisdiction to
tax. (Brock & Co. v. Board 0/ Supervisors, 8 Ca1.2d 286,
289-290 [65 P.2d 791, 110 A.L.R. 700].) Since a properly
apportioned part of migratory property regularly used in
interstate or foreign commerce in the state has such a situs,
the Legislature has provided for its assessment and taxation.
(See Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. County 0/ Los Angeles, 51

